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Royal H. Brin, Jr.*
AS has been true in previous Surveys, the insurance cases decided during
the current reporting period have been primarily concerned with the in-
terpretation of clauses standard in many insurance policies. Although the
decisions often turn on the particular facts of the instant cases, the bases for
the holdings seem general enough to be of relevance to all insurance prac-
titioners.
I. AUTOMOBILE AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
Uninsured Motorist Coverage. Uninsured motorist coverage continues to be
an area of considerable judicial activity, but the developments during the cur-
rent reporting period seem less significant than those of previous years. In
American Motorist Insurance Co. v. Briggs' the Texas Supreme Court con-
sidered the limits of liability in situations in which more than one policy pro-
vides uninsured motorist coverage. While occupying a non-owned automo-
bile for which uninsured motorist coverage was provided by International In-
surance Company, Mr. and Mrs. Briggs, who had uninsured motorist pro-
tection under an American Motorist Insurance Company policy, were injured
by an uninsured motorist. The Briggs settled with 'International for $5,750
each, and in their suit against American Motorist the jury awarded damages
which, after remittitur, amounted to $11,230.39 for Mr. Briggs and
$6,115.95 for Mrs. Briggs. Relying on an "other insurance" clause, which
made it a secondary insurer for accidents in which the insured was driving
a nonowned vehicle, American Motorist urged that International provided
primary coverage so that American Motorist was obligated only for damages
exceeding International's limits of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per acci-
dent. Under this theory, American Motorist would owe Mr. Briggs
$1,230.39 and would owe Mrs. .Briggs nothing. However, following its ear-
lier decision in American Liberty Insurance Co. v. Ranzau,2 the court held
that whenever uninsured motorist coverage exists, the insured has a cause
of action on the policy for his actual damages to the extent of the policy
limits, regardless of the existence of other insurance. If coverage exists un-
der two or more policies, liability is joint and several to the extent of actual
damages, subject to the qualification that no insurer shall pay an amount
* B.A., J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. The author
gratefully acknowledges the very considerable assistance of Ernest R. Higginbotham in
the preparation of this Article.
1. 514 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. 1974).
2. 481 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1972). In Ranzau the court held that the "other in-
surance" clause contravened statutory minimum insurance requirements reflected in the
Texas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h
(Supp. 1975-76). 481 S.W.2d at 796-97.
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in excess of its policy limits. Therefore, Mr. and Mrs. Briggs were entitled
to recover their actual damages from American Motorist, less the amounts
previously paid by International; that is, $5,480.39 to Mr. Briggs and
$365.95 to Mrs. Briggs.
In Holter v. Employers Mutual Fire Insurance Co.3 the court of civil ap-
peals applied the rule of Briggs to a three-car collision. Holter, a passenger
seriously injured in an automobile owned and operated by Hyche, sued Wil-
son and Crew, the drivers of the other two vehicles involved. Holter ob-
tained judgment against Wilson and Crew, jointly and severally, for $31,500
in damages. Allstate, Wilson's insurer, paid $10,000, its policy limits, to
Holter. Crew was uninsured. Holter then brought suit against Employers
Mutual, which provided his uninsured motorist coverage, and against Vico
County Mutual Insurance Company, which provided Hyche's uninsured mo-
torist coverage. Prior to the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Briggs, the
trial court granted both insurers' motions for summary judgment against the
plaintiff. However, the court of civil appeals reversed and rendered, first
holding that Employers and Vico were entitled to credit for the $10,000 paid
to Holter by Allstate, and then applying the rule of Briggs, as follows: "Thus,
in this case, the plaintiff's injuries have caused him damages in excess of
$20,000, the combined limits of the two policies, and since he has been paid
only $10,000, he is entitled to recover another $10,000 under the policies." 4
Several cases decided during the survey period applied and interpreted the
provision, standard in many policies, excluding uninsured motorist coverage
if the insured "shall, without written consent of the company, make any
settlement with any person or organization who may be legally liable there-
for." The Texas Supreme Court recognized the validity of this exclusion by
refusing the application for writ of error in McClelland v. United Services
Automobile Ass'n.5  The stipulated facts were that McClelland was injured
while a passenger in Coulter's automobile, that the collision was proximately
caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist, and that all plaintiffs were
damaged in the total amount of $19,000. The Coulter automobile was in-
sured by Allstate under a policy that included uninsured motorist coverage.
McClelland, a minor, also had uninsured motorist coverage under a policy
issued to her mother by United Services (USAA). All of the plaintiffs set-
tled with Allstate for $9,000 without procuring the written consent of USAA.
In the absence of a stipulation that negligence on the part of the driver of
the Coulter automobile did not proximately cause the accident, the court of
civil appeals held that the settlement caused USAA to lose the valuable
right of subrogation against the Coulter driver, and so the policy provision
voiding USAA's motorist coverage was enforceable."
Although it was apparently assumed in McClelland that a release of the
insurer of an automobile in which plaintiffs were passengers is a release of
3. 520 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston ,[14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
4. Id. at 438.
5. 525 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd).
6. The court considered the case to be controlled by Grissom v. Southern Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 476 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
in which the facts were strikingly similar to those in McClelland.
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"one who may be legally liable" for plaintiff's injuries, the El Paso court of
civil appeals specifically so held in Castorena v. Employers Casualty Co. 7
Such a release, without written consent of plaintiff's carrier, voids the unin-
sured motorist coverage. However, the insurer may waive the exclusion of
coverage for settlement without written consent by a prior denial of liability.
In Stephens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.8 the Fifth Cir-
cuit was confronted with a situation in which newlyweds riding in the wife's
car were in a collision with an uninsured motorist. Mrs. Stephens had unin-
sured motorist coverage under a policy issued to her in her maiden name
by Royal Indemnity Company, while Mr. Stephens' coverage was contained
in a policy issued to him by State Farm. In the collision Mrs. Stephens
was killed and Mr. Stephens was injured, the damages to each exceeding
$20,000. Suit was brought against both Royal Indemnity and State Farm.
State Farm denied coverage on the ground that Mr. Stephens was riding in
an uninsured owned automobile. Without the consent of State Farm, plain-
tiff settled with Royal for $20,000. The district court found State Farm li-
able in the amount of $20,000, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Finding no
Texas cases on point, the court predicted, based on reason and out-of-state
authority, that Texas law would hold that State Farm's denial of coverage
waived the consent clause. Apparently, this prediction was accurate, since
the court in McClelland9 rejected the plaintiff's reliance on Stephens by stat-
ing that Stephens turned solely on the issue of waiver.
Greene v. Great American Insurance Co.,10 a case of first impression, held
that partial rejection of uninsured motorist coverage is permissible. Great
American issued an automobile liability policy, including uninsured motorist
coverage, to Mrs. Greene. Attached to the policy and signed by Mrs. Greene
was Form 119, which specifically denied coverage if the automobile was
driven by Mrs. Greene's son, Oran. While driving his mother's automobile,
Oran was injured by an uninsured motorist and sued Great American. The
court of civil appeals affirmed summary judgment for the insurer on the
ground that the policy clearly did not cover Oran and that the use of Form
119 was not void as against public policy, relying on cases that had approved
the use of Form 119 with respect to liability coverage."
Three cases addressed miscellaneous questions of uninsured motorist cov-
erage. Following the Texas rule that an automobile liability insurer is liable
for exemplary damages imposed against its insured, the court in Home In-
demnity Co. v. Tyler'2 held that an uninsured motorist insurer is liable for
exemplary damages found against the uninsured motorist. Agricultural
Workers Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Baty"1 held that a motorcycle is not
an automobile within the meaning of an owned, but not insured, automobile
7. 526 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
8. 508 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1975).
9. See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
10. 516 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
11. Justice Keith wrote a vigorous dissent to Greene, in which he concluded that
Form 119 excluded Oran's liability coverage, but did not exclude him from uninsured
motorist coverage while driving his mother's automobile. 516 S.W.2d at 743.
12. 522 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
13. 517 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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exclusion. Finally, State Farm County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Landers14
recognized the validity of the provision that a hit-and-run automobile is an
uninsured motor vehicle if "the insured or someone on his behalf shall have
reported the accident within twenty-four hours to a police, peace or judicial
officer or to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles."' 15
Persons Insured. Several opinions dealt with the question of who is insured
under a policy. Melton v. Ranger Insurance Co.' 6 concerned the renter-
pilot exclusion of an aircraft liability policy. Melton and his six passengers
were killed in an aircraft piloted by him, rented from a flying service, and
insured by Ranger Insurance Company. The estate of Melton brought suit
against Ranger to collect the amount of the judgment which the estates of
the passengers had obtained against it after Ranger had refused to defend.
Ranger contended that Melton was not covered because the policy did not
apply "to any person operating the aircraft under the terms of any rental
agreement or training program which provides any remuneration to the
Named Insured for the use of said aircraft."'1 7 Plaintiff contended that the
policy was ambiguous and should, therefore, be construed against the in-
surer, since the declaratory provisions of the policy, entitled "Purpose(s)
of Use" made "rental to pilots" a permitted use of the insured aircraft,
thereby impliedly making a renter-pilot an omnibus insured. In affirming
summary judgment for defendant, the court found no ambiguity since the
declaratory provisions covered the lessor for damage to the aircraft sustained
during rental to a pilot, but as the further limitation indicated, such coverage
did not extend to the renter-pilot.
In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Edelman'8 Government Em-
ployees Insurance (GEICO) had issued a policy to A.H. Edburg, Jr., as
named insured, which listed an automobile owned by his son, Andy. At
the time of the accident, Ronald Edelman was driving Andy's car with
Andy's permission, but there was no evidence that the named insured had
given such permission. It was, therefore, held that Edelman was not covered
by the policy, which limited persons insured to those using the automobile
with the named insured's permission, and GEICO thus had no duty to defend
him.
In Boon v. Premier Insurance Co.19 the court found no coverage of the
named insured's wife, who was injured while occupying another person's ve-
hicle, since she had filed for divorce and separated from her husband and
thus was not a "resident of the same household as the named insured." The
court gave a similarly restrictive reading to the coverage provisions in Gary
Safe Co. v. Transport Insurance Co.,20 holding that the shipper of a safe
via a common carrier was not a "lessee or borrower" of the carrier's delivery
14. 520 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ). See also note
27 infra and accompanying text.
15. Id. at 605.
16. 515 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. Id. at 372.
18. 524 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19. 519 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ).
20. 525 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
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truck so as to be covered, under the loading and unloading provision of the
carrier's comprehensive liability policy, for an injury to the carrier's employee
during the unloading of the safe.
Exclusions. Two courts determined insurance coverage by construing terms
used in policy exclusions. Gustafson v. National Insurance Underwriters21
dealt with the term "passenger" in an aircraft liability policy. After riding
in a private aircraft, Nancy Bischofs climbed out onto the wing and jumped
to the ground. She then raised her left hand to wave to her friends, and
the hand was struck by the propeller. Her parents sued the owners of the
aircraft, Gustafson and Bailey, for her personal injuries. Gustafson and
Bailey called upon the insurer of the aircraft, National -Insurance Underwrit-
ers, to defend, and it refused. The insureds brought this declaratory judg-
ment action for determination of the insurer's obligation to defend against
the Bischofs' lawsuit. The trial court granted the insurer's motion for sum-
mary judgment, since the policy excluded coverage of claims by passengers.
"Passenger" was defined in the policy to include "any person in, on or en-
tering the aircraft for the purpose of riding or flying therein or alighting there-
from following a ride, flight or attempted flight therein."'22 After reviewing
the allegations of the petition, the court of civil appeals affirmed, holding
that, as a matter of law, Nancy Bischofs was alighting from the aircraft and
thus was a passenger within the policy definition.
The meaning of "commercial automobile" was determinative in Maryland
American General Insurance Co. v. Ramsay.23 Ramsay, a civilian employed
by the U.S. Navy as an air conditioning mechanic, was operating a Navy
pickup truck on a public highway when he was involved in a fatal accident.
Mrs. Ramsay sued Maryland American for death benefits under a family
combination automobile policy endorsement entitled "Automobile Death In-
demnity, Total Disability and Specific Disability Benefits." However, this
endorsement excluded "bodily injury or death sustained in the course of his
occupation by any person while engaged (1) in duties incident to the opera-
tion, loading or unloading of, or as an assistant on, a public or livery convey-
ance or commercial automobile. ' 24 Coverage of Ramsay was barred by this
exclusion if the Navy pickup was a "commercial automobile," a term unde-
fined in the policy. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial
court granted plaintiff's motion. The court of civil appeals reversed and ren-
dered judgment for the insurer, holding that although the Navy was not en-
gaged in commerce, Ramsay, whose business it was to install, repair, and
service air conditioning equipment for the Navy, was so engaged; therefore,
the pickup was a commercial automobile. On October 29, 1975, the Texas
Supreme Court granted iRamsay's application for writ of error on the single
point that as a matter of law the pickup was not a commercial automobile.
Notice. In two cases Texas courts considered whether coverage had been
21. 517 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. Id. at 415-16.
23. 526 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ granted).
24. Id. at 139.
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voided by the insured's failure to give notice as soon as practicable. Employ-
ers Casualty -Co. v. Mireles25 held that a delay of over six months was, as
a matter of law, failure to give notice as soon as practicable. Employers
insured Mireles through the Texas Automobile Insurance Plan, formerly the
Texas Assigned Risk Plan. Mireles was involved in a serious automobile
accident on May 21, 1972. Employers was first notified of the accident
when suit papers were delivered to it on December 4, 1972. There was
some evidence that Mireles had given immediate notice of the accident to
the insurance agency at which he had applied for insurance. Although find-
ing no Texas cases on point, the court followed the majority rule that an
assigned risk broker is the agent of the insured and not of the insurer. There-
fore, any notice given to the insurance agency would not constitute notice
to Employers Casualty.
In Employers Casualty Co. v. Scott Electric Co. 2 16 a notice thirteen months
after the accident was held to be, under the circumstances, as soon as prac-
ticable. On October 4, 1968, an explosion of volatile vapors in a barge
docked at Rincon Shipyard caused property damage, personal injuries, and
death to Rincon employees. Part of Rincon's business was using electrical
blowers to blow volatile vapors out of barges. Scott Electric had made serv-
ice calls regarding Rincon's blowers, cables, and breakers. Within an hour
of the accident an employee of Scott went to the scene, and it appeared to
him that the electricity had been off just prior to the accident. In the course
of various investigations, this employee was interviewed three times about
the accident, and never was a suggestion made that the explosion was caused
by electricity or that Scott Electric had in any way caused the explosion. On
November 5 Scott Electric was served with plaintiff's petition, which alleged
that the explosion was caused by improper repair of motors by Scott Electric.
On November 7 Scott 'Electric notified its insurer, Employers Casualty, which
refused to defend. After four days of trial plaintiff's suit against Scott Elec-
tric and others was settled. Scott Electric then sued Employers Casualty.
The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court judgment for Scott Elec-
tric because there was evidence to support the jury finding that notice was
given as soon as practicable. Furthermore, the court felt that, under the
circumstances, Scott Electric had no duty to give notice to Employers Casu-
alty, since, after investigation, there was no reason to believe that Scott Elec-
tric could be liable for damages caused by the explosion.
Venue. In both State Farm County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Landers27 and
Johnson v. Commercial Standard Insurance Co. 28 the plaintiffs contended
that venue was proper in the county in which the cause of action arose.2 9
To support venue plaintiffs, therefore, were obliged to prove that they had
causes of action against the defendant insurers. The insurers urged that such
25. 520 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
26. 513 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
27. 520 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ); see note 14
supra and accompanying text.
28. 521 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
29. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 23 (1964).
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proof included the necessity of negating all policy exclusions which might
defeat coverage. In both cases the courts of civil appeals affirmed the trial
courts' overruling of the insurers' pleas of privilege, holding that the insurers
were required specifically to raise the exclusions under rule 54 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the insureds were not required to disprove
any policy defenses in order to maintain venue.
Limitations. In Hastings v. Royal-Globe Insurance Co.30 plaintiff, claiming
coverage under a policy issued by Royal-Globe to his employer, sought attor-
neys' fees which he had expended in defending a prior suit. The trial court
sustained the insurer's plea in abatement, based on the running of the two-
year statute of limitations. The court of civil appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that Hasting's cause of action against Royal-Globe, based
on a written contract, was governed by the four-year statute of limitations
and that limitations began to run when Hastings was sued, not when the ac-
cident occurred, so that even the two-year period had not run when the in-
stant suit was filed. 31
Standing to Sue. Morris v. Allstate Insurance Co.3 2 dealt with the question
of who has standing to complain of an insurer's refusal to defend. This de-
claratory judgment action was brought by the insured, Copeland. The in-
jured plaintiff, Morris, intervened. The trial court held that the insurer was
not obligated to defend because there was no coverage. The insured did
not appeal, but the intervenor did. The court of civil appeals held that
the injured plaintiff had no standing to complain of the insurer's failure to
defend and that, under policy provisions, she had no right of action against
the insurer until she had established her claim against the insured by judg-
ment or written agreement. However, the court reversed the portion of the
trial court judgment declaring that Allstate was not obligated to pay any
judgment that the plaintiff might obtain against the insured, because such
was an advisory opinion impermissible even in a declaratory judgment action.
Proof of Policy. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Spain,3 3 an action
by Spain against Hartford to collect a judgment obtained against an alleged
insured, turned on whether proof of the policy had been made. The accident
occurred in 1963, and judgment was obtained against the alleged insured,
Loggins, in 1972. Based on a jury finding that Loggins was insured by Hart-
ford at the time of the accident, the trial court entered a judgment for Spain
and against Hartford. The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered, con-
cluding that despite the evidence that Hartford agents investigated the acci-
dent, there was no evidence to support the jury's finding that Hartford in-
sured Loggins on the date of the accident. The court also held that the in-
surer had not judicially admitted the existence of a policy in the prior suit
against Loggins when Spain tried to join the insurer. At that time Hartford
30. 521 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
31. The court also held that Hastings was not required to establish a cause of action
against his employer as a prerequisite to suing Royal. Id. at 873.
32. 523 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ).
33. 520 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ).
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filed a general denial and further sought abatement of any direct suit against
it as a liability insurer of the alleged tortfeasor. Since these were alternative
pleadings, the court held that Hartford had not admitted that it had issued
a policy to Loggins. Even if this were treated as a judicial admission, the
court concluded that by failing to prove the terms of the policy, Spain had
failed to establish a cause of action against Hartford.
Bad Faith Settlement. In Wood Truck Leasing, Inc. v. American Automo-
bile Insurance Co.3 4 an assigned risk insured sought damages from its insurer
for settling claims within the policy limits. In a converse application of the
Stowers Doctrine, 3 plaintiff contended that it was injured by the settlements
because they precipitated higher insurance premiums. The trial court
granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment, but the court of civil
appeals reversed and remanded. Under the policy, the insurer had the right,
absent fraud or bad faith, to make any settlement which it felt expedient;
however, the insured's pleadings contained a general allegation of bad faith
which was sufficient ,to defeat the insurer's motion for summary judgment
on the pleadings alone.
Professional Liability Insurance. A significant statutory development in the
insurance area has been the passage of a special article on rating procedures
in the writing of professional liability insurance. 36 Effective until December
31, 1977, the new procedures set out specific factors which are to be con-
sidered in the setting of rates for this type of coverage. Perhaps the major
section of this statute is that dealing with the filing of claims against a person
or hospital covered by professional liability insurance. All such claims for
breach of express or implied contract, tort, compensation for medical treat-
ment, or hospitalization are subject to a two-year limitations period notwith-
standing provisions to the contrary in any other statute.
3 7
II. LIFE, HEALTH, AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
Fraudulent Representations. Life insurers resisting payment on the ground
that the insured made fraudulent representations in applying for the policy
did not fare well during the reporting period. In Johnson v. Prudential In-
surance Co. of America,3 8 mentioned in the previous Survey,3 9 the Texas
Supreme Court reversed the court of civil appeals' affirmance of a trial court
judgment for the insurer. Mrs. Johnson made statements in her applications
for insurance under a group life policy issued by Prudential that misrepre-
sented her prior problems with cancer. However, the policy contained a pro-
vision, as required by the Texas Insurance Code, that "no statement made
34. 526 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
35. In G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved), the court held that an insurer is required to ex-
ercise ordinary care and prudence in determining whether to accept an offer for settle-
ment within the policy limits.
36. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82 (Supp. 1975).
37. Id. § 4.
38. 519 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1975).
39. Brin, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 172, 181(1975).
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by any person insured shall be used in any contest unless a copy of the instru-
ment containing the statement is or has been furnished to such person or
to his beneficiary."' 40  The insurer did not furnish copies of Mrs. Johnson's
statements to her during her life. Her beneficiary was furnished with copies
of the statements after the insurer had informed him that it was refusing
to pay under the policy. Based on jury findings supportive of the insurer's
defense of fraudulent misrepresentation, the trial court entered judgment for
the insurer. The determinative question before the Supreme Court of Texas
was the admissibility of Mrs. Johnson's statements, because, if they were ad-
missible, the insurer's defense was established. The supreme court rejected
a literal interpretation of the statutorily mandated provision quoted above.
It found that the objective of the legislature was to require the insurer to
provide the insured with copies of his statement so that he could make correc-
tions. Consequently, the court held that the statute and the policy language
required an insurer to furnish promptly to an insured copies of his application
or other written statements material to the issuance of his coverage. Only
if the insured dies immediately and before the insurer has a reasonable op-
portunity to furnish the statements to him may the insurer comply with the
provision by providing statements to the beneficiary. The allegedly decep-
tive statements made by Mrs. Johnson were therefore inadmissible in the
beneficiary's suit against the insurer.
In Bynum v. Signal Life Insurance Co.41 the court of civil appeals reversed
and rendered a take-nothing judgment based upon a jury verdict. In his ap-
plication, the insured denied "any other disease, injury, operation or deform-
ity" and "any other impairment, sickness, [or] injury in [the] past five
years."'4 2 Prior to his application, the insured had some problems with his
left eye, which he attributed to an automobile injury. His death was caused
by a brain tumor. The jury found that the statements in the insured's appli-
cation were false, but that he had not intended to deceive the insurer. Con-
sequently, the court held that the insurer had failed to obtain a favorable
finding on intent, a necessary element of its defense. Additionally, the court
held that the insurer had not relied upon the insured's statements. 'Prior
to issuing its policy, the insurer had the insured examined by its doctor, who
reported the eye problem. The court indicated that since the insurer knew
that the insured's statements were false, it Could not have been misled by
them.
Intent also played a role in the outcome of First Continental Life & Acci-
dent Co. v. Bolton.43 In an interview with an agent of the insured, Bolton
indicated serious prior health problems. The agent completed the applica-
tion but omitted this information. Bolton signed the application, and the
policy was issued with a copy of the complete application attached. The
jury found that in the application for insurance, material untrue statements
were made, but that Bolton did not know that they were untrue. The jury
40. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.50, § 2(3) (1963).
41. 522 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
42. Id. at 697.
43. 524 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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did not answer special issues inquiring whether the statements were made
willfully or whether the insurer relied upon them. Based upon the verdict,
the beneficiary was awarded the proceeds of the policy, the statutory penalty,
and attorneys' fees. The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded, since
under the rule of Odom v. Insurance Co.44 an insured is conclusively pre-
sumed to have knowledge of the contents of any application signed by him.
Thus, Bolton was charged with knowledge of the incorrect statements in his
insurance application. However, the insurer's defense was not established
as a matter of law because the jury had not made a finding on the issue
of intentional misrepresentation. Consequently, the case was remanded for
a new trial.
Beneficiaries. Several cases dealt with beneficiary designations and the pro-
cedure for changing beneficiaries. The Corpus Christi court of civil appeals
held in Box v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co.45 that a court-
approved settlement agreement, in which a divorced husband agreed not to
change the beneficiaries of his life insurance policy without his former wife's
consent, gives the designated beneficiaries a "vested, equitable interest" in
the proceeds of the policy. Box was divorced in 1964. In the property set-
tlement agreement approved by the court and made a part of the judgment,
he agreed that his existing life insurance policy would be kept in force, that
the beneficiaries would be the children of the dissolved marriage, and that
the beneficiaries would not be changed without the consent of his ex-wife.
In 1968, Box changed the beneficiary designation to "Doris F. Bird, friend,"
whom he subsequently married. In this interpleader action, the trial court,
without a jury, awarded the policy proceeds to the children of the first mar-
riage and denied any recovery to the second wife. Additionally, the court
found the insured's estate liable to the children in the amount which the in-
sured had borrowed on the policy prior to his death. The court of civil ap-
peals affirmed.
Sanders v. Great American Reserve Insurance Co.46 also involved a dis-
pute between an insured's widow and his ex-wife. After he married his sec-
ond wife, Jessie Mae, Nathaniel Sanders was issued an insurance certificate
under a group policy, with his ex-wife, Violet, as the named beneficiary. All
premiums on the policy were paid during his marriage to Jessie Mae. Ap-
parently Violet was made beneficiary because the insured was delinquent in
his child support payments to the five minor children of his marriage to Vio-
let. In this interpleader action, the trial court awarded the proceeds of the
policy to Violet, and granted attorneys' fees to Great American. Violet ap-
pealed, complaining that Great American had not been justified in its refusal
to pay her, so that it was not entitled to attorneys' fees, but rather Violet
was entitled to a penalty and attorneys' fees. The court of civil appeals
agreed, and reversed and remanded, holding that an investigation would have
revealed that Jessie Mae had no valid claim, so the insurer was not justified
44. 455 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. 1970).
45. 526 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
46. 525 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. 1975).
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in refusing to pay the proceeds to the named insured, who was also in pos-
session of the certificate. The Texas Supreme Court, however, reversed the
court of civil appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It held
that Jessie Mae's claim, given the facts that she was Nathaniel's wife when
he took out the certificate of insurance, when all premiums were paid, and
when he died, was of possible validity since the policy was purchased with
community funds and the purchase could have constituted constructive fraud
against Jessie Mae. The supreme court thus concluded that interpleader was
properly invoked by Great American, that it was entitled to an award for
attorneys' fees, and that the fact that it filed the interpleader action thirty-
seven days after the demand for payment was not so unreasonable as to just-
ify the imposition of a statutory penalty.
Gladding v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America47 found that the insured
had substantially complied with the procedure for changing her beneficiary,
under a group life insurance policy, from her ex-husband to her parents.
Shortly after her divorce in August of 1970, she filled out the form to desig-
nate her parents. The form was checked, signed, and forwarded by her su-
pervisor to the New York office of IBM, her employer. The New York
office received the form, but returned it for corrections so as to show the
full names of the intended beneficiaries. In November, the insured was
killed in an automobile accident. After her death, the returned form and
a new form, filled out but not signed, were found in the insured's desk. By
directed verdict, the trial court awarded the policy proceeds to the parents
rather than to the ex-husband. The court of civil appeals affirmed on the
theory that the insured had substantially complied with the requirements of
the policy for changing beneficiaries.
In Stewart v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co.48 the insureds brought
suit to require the insurer to record a requested change in beneficiary. The
Stewarts submitted to the company a request that the beneficiary of the pol-
icy on Mrs. Stewart's life be designated one-half to Mr. Stewart, if living,
otherwise to his estate, and one-half to a testatmentary trust created under
Mrs. Stewart's will. Further, the request specified in detail a method of
payment, stating that such payment would release the company of liability
and that no obligation was placed upon the insurer that the insureds were
not legally entitled to impose. After some attempt to negotiate changes in
the submitted request, the insurer refused to record the requested change of
beneficiary. The policy allows the insured "[firom time to time, upon re-
quest satisfactory to the Company" to change beneficiaries. 49 The court of
civil appeals held that this provision does not require the consent of the com-
pany for a change, but simply permits the company to refuse to accept a
change of beneficiary if such is contrary to the express conditions of the
policy or to the law. Since the Stewarts' request merely reiterated some of
the procedures provided in the policy for paying benefits and did not alter
the policy, the insurer was required to record the requested change. Since
47. 521 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. 522 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
49. Id. at 15.
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the trial court had granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment and
denied the insureds' motion, the court of civil appeals reversed and rendered
judgment for the insureds.
Good Health Requirement. In two cases, Texas courts analyzed the inter-
play between the good health requirement and evidentiary requirements. In
Reliable Life Insurance Co. v. Williams5" the Beaumont court of civil appeals
held that although a lay witness testified that the insured appeared to be
in good health, the medical evidence conclusively established that on the date
the policy was issued the insured was suffering from a serious disease which
eventually resulted in his death. Consequently, under the provision that the
policy becomes effective only if the insured is in good health on the date
the policy is issued, the insurer was not liable to pay any benefits. In Na-
tional Old Life Insurance Co. v. Garcia5' the insured sought disability bene-
fits because of blindness and the insurer raised the good health defense. The
jury found that at the time the policy was issued the insured was in good
health. Good health was defined in pertinent part to mean "state of health
free from any disease or bodily infirmity of substantial nature which . . .
materially increases risk to be assumed by the insurance company."52  At
the time the policy was issued, Mr. Garcia was having no vision problems
and his eyesight had been tested to be 20/200. The court of civil appeals
held that Mr. Garcia's degree of blindness constituted, as a matter of law,
a bodily infirmity of a substantial nature which constituted a materially in-
creased insurance risk. Since the infirmity of blindness is measureable as
to degree and since such measurement is controlling when applied to the de-
termination of whether the degree of risk is materially increased, this case
was found to be distinguishable from Coxson v. Atlanta Life Insurance Co.,53
in which the Texas Supreme Court refused to treat as conclusive expert medi-
cal testimony that the insured was not in good health because he was suffer-
ing from tuberculosis.
Policy Exclusions. Various exclusions in life and accident policies were
found inapplicable to defeat coverage in three cases. Southwestern Life In-
surance Co. v. Rowsey 54 involved the interpretation of a partial aviation ex-
clusion endorsement in a life insurance policy. Coverage was provided only
if death occurred as a result of travel or flight "exclusively as a passenger
• . . in a duly registered and certified passenger aircraft being legally op-
erated."' 55 Rowsey was killed in the crash of a private aircraft having two
tandem seats. The aircraft was registered with the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration, which had issued it a "Special Airworthiness Certificate" classifying
the airplane as "experimental" for purposes of "Exhibition, Racing and Re-
search & Development." However, the FAA does not classify any planes
as "certified passenger aircraft." Since the term was not further defined
50. 514 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, no writ).
51. 517 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
52. Id. at 624.
53. 142 Tex. 544, 179 S.W.2d 943 (1944).
54. 514 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
55. Id. at 804.
.[ol. 30
INSURANCE LAW
in the policy, it was given its ordinary meaning: an aircraft capable of carry-
ing passengers. Consequently, Mr. Rowsey's death was not excluded by the
aviation endorsement, and the court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment for the plaintiff.
In Tuttle v. Gamble Alden Life Insurance Co."' the insured was killed
by being pinned in his pickup truck when it caught fire. The policy excluded
coverage for any loss caused or contributed to by "carbon monoxide gas."
Medical testimony indicated that Tuttle died from the inhalation of carbon
monoxide gas caused by the fire. Distinguishing cases in which carbon mon-
oxide gas escaped from a faulty gas heater and from a faulty automobile
exhaust system, the court reasoned that the carbon monoxide gas in the in-
stant case resulted as a chemical reaction in the natural and probable chain
of events following a fire, and death by fire in an automobile is a covered
risk under the policy. Consequently, under these circumstances, the carbon
monoxide exclusion did not operate to deny coverage.
In Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Spradlin 7 the court affirmed
a summary judgment for the insured, holding an exclusionary clause to be
ambiguous. The insurer had issued an accident policy to Spradlin's em-
ployer. The policy excluded coverage for passengers in an aircraft owned
or operated by an insured, a member of his household, or the policyholder.
Spradlin was killed in the crash of an aircraft owned by his employer's presi-
dent, an insured under the policy. The trial court granted Mrs. Spradlin's
motion for summary judgment. The court of civil appeals, relying on an
Eighth Circuit opinion,"5 affirmed, holding the policy exclusion to be ambig-
uous, and thus subject to an interpretation favorable to the insured.
Conversion Rights. An analysis of conversion rights figured prominently in
two cases decided during this reporting period. In First National Bank v.
Protective Life Insurance Co.5 9 the Fifth Circuit considered the availability
of conversion options once the policy is allowed to lapse. Robinson pur-
chased a $100,000 life insurance policy in 1965 and subsequently transferred
title, in trust, to the First National Bank. Robinson failed to pay the premi-
ums and the policy lapsed. Coverage continued under the automatic opera-
tion of the extended term, non-forfeiture provision of the policy. However,
the bank tried to exercise the policy's conversion option and the insurer re-
fused to allow conversion. The bank then elected the $10,000 paid-up insur-
ance option under the non-forfeiture provisions. After Robinson died, the
bank brought suit for $100,000, claiming that the insurer had breached its
contract. The trial court entered judgment for the bank in the amount of
$10,000 and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that after the policy lapsed,
the conversion options were no longer available.
In Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Hurley6" the insurer issued a life in-
surance policy to Mrs. Hurley in 1964. Under a rider, her minor daughter,
56. 385 F. Supp. 1352 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
57. 526 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'dn.r.e.).
58. Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America, 459 F.2d 650
(8th Cir. 1972).
59. 511 F.2d 731 (5thCir. 1975).
60. 513 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ).
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Laura, was afforded $1,000 term life and given an option to exchange the
policy for five times as much coverage at age twenty-one. In 1970 Laura
turned twenty-one and converted the policy. In 1972 less than two years
after the issuance of the converted policy, Laura died by suicide. Both the
original policy and the converted policy contained a suicide clause that de-
nied coverage if the insured committed suicide within two years of the policy
date. In entering judgment for the beneficiary, the trial court held, as a
matter of law, that the suicide clause in the converted policy was a continu-
ation of the prior clause in the policy issued to Laura's mother so that the
two years began to run when the original policy was issued. The court of
civil appeals affirmed, holding that the new policy was issued in accordance
with the terms of the exchange rider of the original policy so that the rights
and obligations were fixed by the prior contract and simply effectuated by
the conversion.
Hospitalization and Medical Policies. Three cases decided miscellaneous
questions under hospitalization-medical policies. In Troy v. Mutual Life In-
surance Co."1 the insurer was allowed to offset against payment of a claim
covered under the policy the amount which it previously and erroneously had
paid on a claim that was not covered under the policy. In Group Hospital
Service, Inc. v. State Farm Insurance Co. 62 the court of civil appeals upheld
a hospitalization and medical insurer's right of subrogation against a tort-
feasor's liability insurer for the amount of hospital and medical payments
made to its insured as a result of the tortfeasor's negligence. In Zimmer-
man v. National Home Life Insurance Co.0 3 the court of civil appeals held
that although a nursing home had a "hospital" facility nearby and available,
it was not a hospital as that term Was defined in a hospitalization indemnity
policy, so the insured was not entitled to policy benefits during his confine-
ment therein.
Limitations. In Proctor v. Southland Life Insurance Co.64 the insured
brought suit for total disability benefits. The insurer raised policy defenses,
including the bar of limitations since suit was brought more than three years
(the limitation period specified in the policy) after the injury that caused
the disability. The trial court granted the insurer's motion for summary judg-
ment. The court of civil appeals reversed, holding that since the disability
was continuous, the period of disability would be treated as a single unit and
no portion of the insured's cause of action was barred simply because suit
was brought more than three years after the inception of the disability.
Accidental Injury. In Ritchie v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.6 5
the court of civil appeals reaffirmed the adage that crime does not pay. The
insured sued for his son's medical expenses incurred as a result of a gunshot
wound. The son was shot during the commission of a crime to which he
61. 514 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
62. 517 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, no writ).
63. 517 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
64. 522 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. 521 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
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later pleaded guilty. The insurer asserted the defense that the injury was
not accidental. The trial court granted the insurer's motion for summary
judgment and the court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that under the cir-
cumstances the son could reasonably have anticipated his injuries since he
had been warned that his pursuer had a gun before he began to run; there-
fore, his injuries were not accidental.
Credit Life Insurance. American Capitol Insurance Co. v. Karnes County
Savings & Loan Ass'n66 involved the question of whether James Colvin was
an eligible borrower when his certificate of insurance was issued. Colvin
had an outstanding loan with Karnes County Savings on May 26, 1972, when
the insurer issued its master policy to Karnes County Savings. On Septem-
ber 27, 1972, Colvin was issued a certificate under the policy. When he
died in 1973, the insurer refused to pay, and suit was brought. In its defi-
nition of "elegible borrowers" who were entitled to coverage, the policy in-
cluded present borrowers with "their present loans not in default on the effec-
tive date of this group policy and for exactly seven (7) days thereafter. '8 7
Karnes County Savings and the executrix of Colvin's estate argued that Col-
vin qualified under this provision since 'his loan was not in default on the
date ,the master policy was issued, nor was it in default within seven days
thereafter, so that he was eligible to receive a certificate even if it was not
issued until several months after the master policy. However, in reversing
and remanding the court of civil appeals agreed with the insurer that the
policy provision provided for an enrollment period, as allowed by the Texas
Insurance Code, 6 8 of seven days in which present borrowers must be issued
certificates. Since Colvin was not issued a certificate within seven days of
the issuance of the master policy, he was not an eligible borrower unless he
could qualify under some other provision of the policy, which he was unable
to do. Karnes County Savings and the executrix of Colvin's estate further
argued that the insurer waived any condition precedent by issuing a certifi-
cate to Colvin more than seven days after the master policy was issued. At
the time the master policy was issued, Colvin had a certificate from a prior
insurer which was kept in effect for ithe short time until his new certificate
was issued. Mr. Colvin continued to be charged monthly for credit life in-
surance. Although waiver cannot create a new and different contract, the
court of civil appeals found that the meager summary judgment proof did
not rule out waiver as a matter of law and remanded the cause for trial on
the merits.
III. FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE
Subrogation. McBroome-Bennett Plumbing, Inc. v. Villa France, Inc.69 pre-
sented the novel question of whether a subcontractor is a co-insured under
a builder's risk policy issued to an owner/general contractor. Westchester
66. 526 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ dism'd).
67. Id. at 690.
68. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.53, § 5 (Supp. 1975-76).
69. 515 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Fire Insurance Company issued a builder's risk policy to Villa France, the
owner and general contractor of an apartment house under construction.
Subsequently, Villa France hired McBroome-Bennett as a plumbing subcon-
tractor. McBroome-Bennett's employees negligently caused a fire which
damaged the apartment building in an amount in excess of $15,000. West-
chester paid Villa France for the damage and brought this suit in Villa
France's name against McBroome-Bennett. McBroome Bennett contended
that it was an unnamed co-insured party under the policy and counterclaimed
for the balance due on its subcontract and for the value of its tools that were
destroyed in the fire. Based on stipulated facts, the trial court awarded
Westchester the amount of the loss, allowed McBroome-Bennett its counter-
claim on the subcontract, but denied McBroome-Bennett's claim for the loss
of its tools. Villa France was the only insured named in the policy; however,
the policy covered "property of the assured or property for which the assured
is liable" at the apartment house complex. 0 McBroome- Bennett contended
that it was an unnamed co-insured because it had the following property in-
terests within the coverage of the contract: its tools in the building, its work
that was destroyed by the fire for which it had not been paid, and its security
interest in the entire project for the balance due under its contract. If Mc-
Broome-Bennett was a co-insured under the policy, then Westchester could
not assert as a subrogee rights of one insured against another insured. How-
ever, the court of civil appeals rejected this argument and affirmed the trial
court by holding that McBroome-Bennett was not a co-insured under the
policy. The court concluded that the policy insured the subcontractor's prop-
erty to the extent that Villa France was liable for it, but that the policy did
not make the negligent subcontractor a co-insured so as to prevent the insurer
from seeking reimbursement for the loss paid to its assured. Justice Guittard
dissented, pointing to out-of-state authority that language such as "for which
the insured is liable" creates insurance coverage which attaches to the prop-
erty for the benefit of the unnamed owners, and does not merely indemnify
the named assured against liability to the owner. 71
Insured Risks. Several cases have construed policy terms to determine
which risks are included and excluded from coverage under the policy. Glens
Falls Insurance Co. v. Covert72 involved a policy insuring Covert's business
and premises "against all risk of physical loss or damage." A number of
vehicle safety stabilizers owned by Covert fell from a shelf to the floor.
These stabilizers were sealed units which could not be inspected for internal
damage. Subsequently, the manufacturer of the stabilizers withdrew its war-
ranty and Covert decided not to attempt to sell the stabilizers without the
warranty. The trial court, without a jury, entered judgment for Covert, but
the court of civil appeals reversed and rendered, holding that there was no
evidence that the property in question had suffered physical loss or damage.
Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Raffkind 3 involved the definition of "sur-
70. Id. at 35.
71. Id. at 41.
72. 526 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
73. 521 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ).
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face water" under a homeowner's policy. Water seeped under plaintiff's
house and collected in underground heat and air conditioning ducts so as
to cause excessive humidity, which damaged the interior of the house. The
policy excluded coverage of loss caused by or resulting from "surface water."
Based on a jury verdict, the trial court entered judgment for the insured.
The court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that plaintiff's damages were not
caused by "surface water" since the water in question had soaked into the
soil, thereby losing its character as surface water.
In Allen v. Manhattan Fire & Marine Insurance Co.74 plaintiff's truck was
damaged by an "implosion," which the parties defined as an internal collapse
followed immediately by an outward rush of air. The policy insured against
losses from explosions. The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court
judgment for the insurer, holding that an implosion was not an explosion
within the meaning of the policy.
In Crocker v. Gulf Insurance Co. 75 the court considered whether a motor-
cycle was an automobile as defined in a homeowner's policy. Although the
court could find no cases construing this term in the context of a homeowner's
policy, it concluded that the policy definition of automobile included a motor-
cycle.76
Insurable Interests. In Hinojosa v. Allstate Insurance Co.7 7 plaintiff
brought suit under a homeowner's policy to recover for fire damage. The
insurer contended that plaintiff had no insurable interest in the property, at-
taching as an exhibit to its motion for summary judgment a copy of a deed
to the subject property, dated approximately one month prior to the loss,
from Hinojosa to a third party. The trial court granted the insurer's motion.
The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the certified
copy of the deed did not establish as a matter of law that plaintiff had no
insurable interest in the property in question. There was no provision in
the policy invalidating the policy upon change of ownership, so a question
of fact was presented as to whether Hinojosa had an insurable interest in
the property at the time of the fire.
Liability of Agent. Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Fuller78 involved
an insurance agent's liability to his principal for failure to reduce the cov-
erage of a policy. The agent issued a policy to the insured in the amount
of $25,000. The insurer subsequently instructed the agent to reduce the
amount of coverage to $10,000. The agent failed to do so and the insured
suffered damage to its building in the amount of $24,000. The trial court
found that the agent was not liable to the insurer, but the court of civil ap-
peals reversed and rendered, holding that the agent breached its contract with
74. 519 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1975, no writ).
75. 524 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ).
76. Compare Agricultural Workers Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Baty, 517 S.W.2d 901
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in text accompanying note 13
supra, in which a motorcycle was held not to be an automobile in the context of an
exclusion to a liability policy.
77. 520 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ).
78. 524 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the insurer and that the insurer's failure to mitigate damages by taking ac-
tion to cancel or reduce the limits of the policy was no defense.
Proof of Loss. In Tompkins v. Southern Lloyds Insurance Co.79 plaintiff
sued for fire damage to his home and household goods, claiming a loss of
$19,607.93. The insurer had paid $13,130.89 and admitted that it owed
an additional $1,423.00, which the insured had refused to accept, but urged
that such was the limit of its liability. The jury found that it would reason-
ably cost $6,505.09, in addition to the $13,130.89 already paid, to repair
the damage to plaintiff's property. After the fire, plaintiff had signed a proof
of loss indicating his loss to be $13,130.89. He also signed a statement ac-
knowledging that his supplemental claim would not exceed $1,423.00. The
insurer contended that by signing these forms the plaintiff settled all claims
under the policy. The trial court agreed and granted defendant's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; however, the court of civil appeals
reversed and rendered, holding that a proof of loss is not evidence of the
extent of loss and that the forms signed by plaintiff did not constitute re-
leases.
Appraisal. In Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Fraiman8 0 the insured sought
a declaratory judgment to enforce the appraisal provision of a fire insurance
policy. The insured suffered fire loss and had requested the insurer to ap-
point an appraiser to determine the replacement cost of the damaged prop-
erty. The insurer refused to do so. The trial court granted the insured's
motion for summary judgment and required the insurer to appoint an ap-
praiser. The insurer's primary argument was that the appraisal provided for
in the policy was really an arbitration proceeding which, by statute, is unen-
forceable in Texas, 8 ' so that the common law principle that an agreement
to enter into arbitration may be revoked by either party prior to an award
governs. In affirming, the court of civil appeals rejected this argument, hold-
ing that the appraisal clause was not a provision for arbitration. Finding
no Texas cases which had considered whether the insured may compel an
appraisal, the court turned to out-of-state authorities and adopted the major-
ity rule, holding that appraisal provisions in insurance contracts are specifi-
cally enforceable by either the insurer or the insured.
79. 515 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
80. 514 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 114th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
81. TEx. REv. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (1973).
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